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ABSTRACT: New insights into the failure mechanism piping (under-seepage) regarding the physical 
process as well as reliability aspects have led to a revision of the Dutch design and safety assessment 
rules for dikes. This paper describes how the required factor of safety for piping is derived from a top 
level requirements formulated in terms of an acceptable probability of flooding. The main steps herein are 
(a) to account for the length-effect to translate requirements on dike ring (system) level to admissible 
probabilities of failure on dike section (element) level and (b) the calibration of safety factors as a func-
tion of the (element) target reliability.  
Keywords: code calibration, piping, under-seepage, target reliability, length-effects 
Nomenclature 
D [m] : thickness of sand layer  
FF [-] : force factor  
FG [-] : geometrical shape factor  
FR [-] : resistance factor  
FS [-] : scale factor  
H [m] : hydraulic head difference (across structure) 
Hc [m] : critical hydraulic head difference 
L [m] : seepage length 
RD [-] : relative density  
RDm [-] : mean relative density (small scale experiments -0.725) 
c [-] : erosion coefficient  
d70 [m] : 70-percentile value of grain size distribution of the piping-sensitive layer 
d70m [m] : mean value of  d70  value in the experiments (small scale experiments -2.08e-4)  
h [m+REF]: waterside water level 
hb [m+REF]: landside water level 
p [N/m3] : unit weight of particles  
w [N/m3] : unit weight of water  
 [-] : Whites constant  
 [DEG] : Bedding angle of sand  
 [m2] : intrinsic permeability  
R  [-] importance factor  
VR  [-] coefficient of variation p  [-] safety factor 
h [m] the normative water level 
d [m] Blanket layer thickness 
hb [m] decimal height 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Primary flood defenses in the Netherlands undergo a 5-yearly safety assessment. Based on economic as 
well as societal risk acceptance criteria, the current safety standards are defined in terms of exceedance 
probabilities of hydraulic load conditions (see Figure 1). For failure mechanisms other than overtopping 
these are commonly interpreted as admissible probabilities Pf,adm,dr of (system) failure of a dike ring (pol-
der). That implies that the criteria to be handled for individual dike sections and failure mechanisms need 
to be stricter: Pf,adm,ds,mech < Pf,adm,dr. That is for two reasons: (a) each mechanism can cause failure and (b) 
(b) failure of each individual section means system failure. We are dealing with a serial system. A third 
component is the length-effect. The probability of failure increases with increasing length of a dike sec-
tion with statistically homogeneous properties (Vrouwenvelder, 2006). 
 
 
Normative Exceedance  
Frequency [1/yr] 
1/10,000 
1/4,000 
1/2,000 
1/1,250 
high grounds 
Germany 
North Sea 
Belgium 
Figure 1. Normative exceedance probabilities of Hydraulic Load Conditions in the Netherlands 
 
All these aspects illustrate the need to establish higher target reliabilities locally and for each failure 
mechanism in order to achieve a sufficiently reliable dike ring (system). In order to translate these re-
quirements into practical terms, semi-probabilistic assessment and design rules need to be derived, using 
characteristic values and (partial) factors of safety instead of reliability analysis techniques. 
This paper describes how a local assessment rule for piping (under-seepage) has been derived, the goal 
of which is to be consistent with the high level criteria in terms of probabilities of flooding. Before going 
into the details of the calibration code, the revised piping model is described, including a concise discus-
sion of the model uncertainty. Subsequently, the format of the new safety assessment rules is presented 
and the derivation of the required factor of safety is discussed. The latter consists of two main steps: (a) 
derivation of the acceptable probability of (piping) failure of a dike section and (b) the calibration of the 
required factor of safety as function of the target reliability. 
2 REVISED PIPING MODEL 
2.1 The Equilibrium Model by Sellmeijer (1988) 
Sellmeijer (1988) proposed a computational for piping with three main elements: groundwater flow, pipe 
flow through the erosion channel and limit equilibrium of soil particles in the channel. For safety assess-
ment purposes, the following equilibrium condition was derived, which describes the critical gradient 
over the structure. In other words, for lower gradients (H/L) the erosion pipe development stops accord-
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ing to the model, whereas for higher gradients the erosion may reach the upstream side and thereby en-
danger the integrity of the structure by “under-mining” it. 
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The geometry and soil parameters are specified in the section Nomenclature; coefficient c  is composed of 
three factors:  
- FR: resistance factor, being the strength of the sand  
- FS: scale factor, relating pore size and seepage size  
- FG: geometrical shape factor  
 
Notice that this criterion does not address the appearance of sand boils like exit gradient-based criteria do. 
Using this equilibrium criterion in safety assessment one implicitly allows sand boils to occur, while pipe 
development until the upstream side is avoided. 
For more complex geometries than a simple aquifer covered by a blanket layer, both with constant 
thickness, the criterion (in a slightly simplified form) has been implemented in MSEEP, a numerical code 
for groundwater flow computations. 
2.2 Revision of the Sellmeijer Model 
Recently, a detailed experimental research of the piping mechanism in The Netherlands (Lopez de la 
Cruz et al., 2010) has provided better insights into the underlying physical phenomenon and led to a revi-
sion of the Sellmeijer model. A multivariate regression analysis enabled re-calibrating the coefficients in 
the model, by assessing the influence of each measured variable on the critical head simultaneously, re-
sulting in 
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Besides new coefficients the revised model contains a dependency on the relative density (RD) of the pip-
ing sensitive sand layer (i.e. aquifer, usually the upper few decimeters). However, for safety assessment 
purposes, the influence of RD is not taken into account. It is hard to determine in the field and of little in-
fluence despite the large uncertainty. Therefore, it was preferred to include it in the model uncertainty. 
Notice that for “non-standard” geometries the piping module in MSeep is also available for the revised 
model and recommended for determining FG. 
2.3 Model Uncertainty 
The model uncertainty is accounted for by a multiplicative model with factor mc: 
R S G
1c
c c
H m m F F F
L c
    (3) 
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The experimental results from Beek et al. (2010) have been analyzed for determining the parameters of 
the model factor, which is chosen to be modeled by a lognormal distribution. Its standard deviation is de-
termined by a weighted variance-analysis, in which more weight is given to the available data from proto-
type scale than to the small and medium scale laboratory experiments (Lopez de la Cruz et al., 2010). The 
resulting standard deviation of the model factor is mc=0.12, the scatter of the comparison of predicted 
versus observed critical head difference is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Observed vs. predicted (revised piping model) critical piping gradients 
3 SAFETY ASSESSMENT RULE 
The revised piping model can be used to assess the resistance against piping in terms of the critical head 
difference: 
   (4) R S Gc cH m F F F L
For safety assessments this value can be compared to the head difference the structure experiences. For 
the Dutch safety assessment rules it was decided to handle the same reduction term as in the current 
guidelines: 
0.3bH h h d     (5) 
Consequently, the format of the new safety assessment rule is chosen such that the ratio of the critical 
head difference Hc (resistance) and the head difference including reduction term (load) using characteris-
tic values (5% respectively 95% quantiles) is required to be larger than the safety factor p: 
, , , ,,
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Notice that the characteristic factors Fi,k are determined by using 5%/95%-quantiles for their input pa-
rameters. Furthermore, the characteristic (or, in fact, design value) for the water level hk is taken to be the 
normative water level (MHW) as defined in the Hydraulic Boundary Conditions (Rijkswaterstaat, 2007).  
The procedure to determine the characteristic values is beyond the scope of this study; reference is made 
to Eurocode 0. 
4 TARGET RELIABILITY AND FACTOR OF SAFETY 
The main goal of the calibration is to determine (partial) safety factors that, if consequently used in de-
sign or safety assessment, lead to a structure that is at least as safe as the predetermined target reliability. 
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Commonly, in codes and standards (e.g., Eurocode) the target reliability is chosen from safety classes that 
reflect the severity of the consequences - the more severe the consequences the higher the target reliabil-
ity. For the Dutch flood defense system that basic concept is the same, except that the target reliability is 
defined by the exceedance probabilities1 (Figure 1) as probabilities of flooding. In other words, these are 
admissible probabilities of (system) failure. The probability that any of the elements of a dike ring (i.e., 
dike or other flood defenses) fails is defined as: Pf,adm,dr [1/yr]. That means that this probability cannot be 
used to define one target reliability for a particular structure in the system directly.  
The first step is a apragmatic one: The probability of system failure is distributed over the failure 
mechanisms in the system that play a significant role. For piping the admissible probability of failure is 
10% of the total: Pf,adm,dr,p = 0.1 Pf,adm,dr. This distribution over failure mechanisms can be treated as eco-
nomic optimization problem, however, these considerations are beyond the scope of this paper. 
The second step is to translate dike ring requirements into dike section requirements. The latter beings 
the level at which designs and safety assessments are carried out. The key element in this step is the 
length-effect (Vrouwenvelder, 2006). The probabilities of failure of the flood defenses that form a dike 
ring are partially correlated. Usually, there is a large (spatial) correlation between the loads on different 
sections, where also the resistance properties are highly independent. That implies that the probability of 
failure somewhere in the dike ring is larger than the probability of failure of one (or the weakest) element 
(i.e., dike section): Pf,adm,dr,p > Pf,adm,ds,p. This is accounted for by incorporating the length effect. The de-
tails are further discussed in section 5. 
 
 
Figure 3. Steps to determine Target Reliability 
TOP LEVEL REQUIREMENT LOCAL TARGET RELIABILTY 
Acceptable probability of 
failure of the dike ring: 
Pf,adm,dr 
Acceptable probability of fail-
ure per mechanism (dike ring): 
Pf,adm,dr,mech 
Acceptable probability of failure 
per mechanism (dike section): 
Pf,adm,dr,mech 
account for length-effect account for contributions 
of several mechanisms 
 
Having determined the target reliability, the actual calibration code is applied. A convenient starting point 
is to pick standardized values for importance factors such as given in the Eurocode. For example, for a 
dominant load parameter: R = 0.8 with the standard formulae for partial resistance factors. However, 
from the FLORIS project Rijkswaterstaat (2005) it is known that for piping the importance factors can 
vary significantly and even exceed R = 0.8. Therefore, an appropriate value for p for varying conditions 
is examined directly by the analysis described in Figure 4. Further details are discussed in section 6. 
 
 
Figure 4. Steps to analyze the appropriateness of values for the required safety factor p 
Choose a value of p Find the seepage length L such 
that the design rule (eq. 6) is 
fulfilled (Hc,k/H=p) 
Determine the reliability index 
for this condition (i.e., design): 

5 LENGTH EFFECTS 
Applying zero-level crossing theory for the input parameters to the piping model, a relationship between 
the admissible probability of failure for a dike section and the admissible probability of failure on dike 
ring together is established. This includes the influence of the dike sections lengths  Ldr,s that are sensitive 
to piping (i.e., potentially contribute to the probability of failure). A detailed description of this analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper but more details can be found in Lopez de la Cruz (2010). The result is 
represented in Figure 5. 
                                                 
1 The normative exceedance probabilities are not exactly the admissible probabilities of flooding, but in the context of code 
calibration for failure mechanisms other than overtopping are interpreted as such. 
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Figure 5. Relation between target reliability, (sensitive) dike ring length and acceptable probability of piping for a dike ring 
 
The target reliability req=--1(Pf,adm,ds,p) increases with the (piping-sensitive) cumulative length of dike 
sections Ldr,s forming the dike ring. For practical purposes, the following formula is proposed which fits 
the relations in Figure 5 very well: 
   , ,, , ,
,
0.1
1 /
f adm dr
f adm ds p
eq dr s
P
P
l L    (8) 
where 
   Calibration factor 
eql   Correlation length of the limit estate function for piping 
 
For characteristic Dutch conditions a value of / eql =0.0028 is proposed.  
6 UNCERTAINTIES AND CALIBRATION DATA SETS 
In order to check the suitability of p as described in Figure 4, a set of conditions to analyze (parameter 
sets) are needed as well as their probability distributions per parameter. For the latter, it is recurred to the 
probabilistic modeling in the FLORIS project. The distribution types and variation coefficients (or stan-
dard deviations) per parameter are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Probability distributions of piping load and resistance parameters 
Parameters Type Mean Spread (V=CoV, σ=Std) 
D 
Log-
normal nominal V=5.0 
k 
Log-
normal nominal V=1e-6 
L 
Log-
normal nominal V=0.24 
d70 
Log-
normal nominal V=6e-5 
eta Normal 0.25 V=0 
theta Normal 37 σ=0 
m_p 
Log-
normal 0.12 σ=0.12 
h_b normal nominal σ=0.10 
h Gumbel nominal σ =0.39 
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The assessment rule should hold for the range of conditions that is expected to be encountered in practice. 
To establish these conditions, for each parameter with nominal mean value in the table a low, medium 
and high value (for typical Dutch conditions) have been chosen. The resistance parameters are summa-
rized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Nominal Values of Piping Resistance Parameters for Calibration Sets 
Variable Unfavourable Average Favourable 
D [m] 50 15 5 k [m/s] 1E-04 1E-05 1E-06 d70 [m] 1,2E-04 2,0E-04 4,0E-04 d [m] 0,1 2,5 6,0 
 
For the load parameters (influencing the head difference H) three parameter sets are chosen to represent 
different hydraulic load regimes together with the according acceptable probability of flooding (see Table 
3). 
 
Table 3.  Parameter Sets of Hydraulic Load Variables  
 Coast River Estuary 
P(h>MHW) 10000 1250 4000 
hk = MHW [m+NAP] 3,3 6,3 3,1 h10 (decimate height) [m] 0,75 0,7 0,35 hb  [m+NAP] -2,5 4,2 -1,0 
 
The first three parameters in the table above can be used to define a the Gumble distribution for the water 
level.  
The“decimate height” is the water level difference that increases the exceedance probability of the wa-
ter level by a factor 10 with respect to the normative water level with known exceedance probability: 
10( ) 10 (P h MHW P h h     )  (9) 
Combining each load parameter set with each of the resistance variables, we obtain 243 (=3^5) calibra-
tion parameter sets. 
7 CALIBRATION RESULTS 
The calibration analysis has been carried out for each of the 243 parameter sets (previous section) and for 
six different values of the partial resistance factor γp: 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8. This section presents a sum-
mary of the calibration results. 
 
Each of the points in the figure 6 shows which value of the reliability index (horizontal axis) is found for 
the underlying parameter set and the p (vertical axis). 
The results present some clusters due to the hydraulic load regimes and the selected blanket layer 
thickness, which acts in this case as a load reduction term. In order to illustrate this, the data points are 
plotted with different colors and shapes (see legend).  
 
From Figure 6, it can be seen that the load conditions together with the blanket layer thickness determine 
the performance of the safety factor. 
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Figure 6: Overview Calibration Results: required safety factor p vs. realized reliability index 
The black line presents the proposed linear relationship between the required reliability and the partial re-
sistance factor: 
 0.6 1.5 (1.2 1.8)p req p       (10) 
 
The line is chosen on the left of the scatter points, approximately through the 95%-quantiles per safety 
factor level. That means that for 95% of the (calibration) cases the reliability achieved by applying the 
safety factor is higher than the target reliability, while 5% of the (rather extreme) cases would result in a 
slightly unconservative design, which was supposed to be acceptable. The lower limit of p was a political 
decision maintaining safety factor of 1.2 that is currently in use as a lower limit. 
A point in the upper left region of the scatter implies a region with under-performance. However, all of 
these points are triangles, meaning that they represent river load conditions. In the Netherlands, those ar-
eas have safety requirements that do not exceed req=4.7 even for the longest dike rings. Therefore, these 
points are irrelevant.  
The green in the figure 6, indicates the range of γp-values expected to be applied using the proposed 
assessment rule in the Netherlands, based on the relevant range of required reliability index including the 
length-effect. The resulting range is 1.2 < γp < 1.6 with the remark that values of 1.4 are expected to be 
exceeded only in rare cases such as long dike rings with low acceptable probability of flooding. 
The red dashed and dotted lines indicate the resulting safety factor values after the standard level-I 
equations for lognormal distributed resistance is applied for different combinations of importance factor 
(R) and coefficient of variation (VR). 
8 DISCUSSION 
A target reliability-dependent safety factor for piping is derived for design and safety assessment in the 
Netherlands. The incorporation of the presented results in the design guidelines is still pending. The tar-
get reliability is derived from specific flood protection norms in the Netherlands instead of consequence 
classes such as used in the Eurocode. In the derivation, it is accounted for system reliability aspects such 
as accounting for several mechanisms as well as for the length-effect. 
Taking into account the scatter of the calibration points around the proposed relation between the 
safety factor and the target reliability shows a typical aspect of semi-probabilistic design and safety as-
sessments. For a significant range of the chosen conditions, the approach leads to over-design. This can 
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be avoided by more differentiation. For example, by establishing different safety factors for different load 
regimes or by reliability-based design ( reliability analysis in safety assessment). 
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